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Abstract 
 
This paper re-examines the Romer [1990] “knowledge driven” endogenous growth 
model in an open economy setting. As an alternative to Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
[1991], we consider trade between two absolutely identical countries that are 
characterized by imperfect competition in one of the trade goods. Contrary to Rivera-
Batiz and Romer [1991], we find that trade in goods without trade in ideas is 
detrimental to long run growth while trade in goods in conjunction with trade in ideas 
is good for long run growth.  We further demonstrate that the pro-competitive gains 
from trade in goods is analogous to the analysis of imperfect competition by standard 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 
Endogenous growth theory has enjoyed enormous attention over the last 
several years.   New growth theory, as it is sometimes referred, considers 
technological change, growth, and welfare in the context of a neoclassical 
representative agent model.  Amongst the abundant literature, papers that explicitly 
consider the nature of technological change include Romer [1990] with “knowledge 
driven growth”, Grossman and Helpman [1991] with “quality ladders,” and Aghion 
and Howitt [1992] with “creative destruction.”  Each of these papers has received 
wide acclaim to the effect that they now rank among the seminal works in the New 
Growth Theory literature.  Consequently, these papers provide the frameworks for 
subsequent research extensions. 
One such extension is the paper by Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991]. They 
attempt to analyse the Romer [1990] model in an open economy setting.  Their results 
are now part of the standard fare of many graduate macroeconomics courses and the 
textbooks that they use.
1   
This paper re-examines the Romer [1990] “knowledge driven” endogenous 
growth model in an open economy setting.  We present an alternative specification to 
that which is found Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991].  They consider two countries that 
are identical only up until the point in which trade opens, after which, by assumption 
they cease to be identical.  They assume that once open, each country may produce 
unique intermediate goods, avoid redundancy, and thereby earn monopoly rents 
worldwide.  Therefore, each firm may exploit its monopoly across both countries until 
a competitor, who must necessarily be foreign, comes along with a better intermediate 
good.  As a result, the two countries take turns introducing innovations.  Furthermore, 
there is no change in output, work effort, or growth from autarky to trade because,   3
with trade, the intermediate goods producer is effectively faced with twice the market 
for half the time.  They conclude that,  “…free trade in goods (without trade in 
ideas)… does not affect log run growth rates” [Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991, p.544]. 
We assume that the two countries are absolutely identical before and after 
trade.  In autarky, each country produces its own version of each new innovation. 
With trade, each country simultaneously continues to produce a version of each new 
intermediate good.  The home and foreign versions of each new intermediate good are 
perfect substitutes for one another such that pro-competitive gains from trade may 
result. 
This paper shows, in the context of the Romer [1990] model, that trade in 
goods without trade in ideas is detrimental to long run growth while trade in goods in 
conjunction with trade in ideas is good for long run growth.  Furthermore, we 
demonstrate that the nature of trade in goods is analogous to the standard pro-
competitive gains from trade result from the international trade literature on imperfect 
competition. 
The Romer [1990] model considers technological change to be a result of 
existing technology combined with human capital.  The greater the stock of 
technology at any given time, the greater is the potential for even greater 
technological advances at that time, given some human capital expenditure.  The 
representative agent allocates his human capital competitively between the final goods 
sector and R&D sector.  Final goods are produced from human capital, labour, and a 
continuum of intermediate goods.  Intermediate goods, imperfect substitutes for one 
another, are produced trivially from final goods.   
Trade between identical countries under these circumstances is intuitively 
identical to those results from imperfect competition in the trade literature.  In other   4
words, imperfect competition is an effective determinant of trade that results in pro-
competitive gains.
2  The move from autarky to free trade in goods effectively changes 
each intermediate good producer’s market structure from monopoly to duopoly.   
Consistent with standard trade theory, cross country competition between rival 
monopolists results in each intermediate firm producing more output to sell at a lower 
price. Although there is no actual trade, existence of a rival creates pro-competitive 
gains from trade, which implies increased production of intermediate goods and a fall 
in its price.   With greater intermediate goods to work with, the marginal products of 
labour and human capital both increase in the production of final goods.  Furthermore, 
lower monopoly profits today implies lower profits tomorrow.  In other words, pro-
competitive gains from trade also implies a lower marginal product of research.  The 
agent responds accordingly by devoting more human capital towards final production 
and less toward research.  Since the growth rate of technology is a function of the 
human capital devoted to research, trade in goods without trade in ideas hurts long run 
growth.   
Once trade in ideas is also allowed, the wealth effect of doubling the size of 
the market for new ideas overwhelms the substitution effect from the change in the 
relative price of human capital.  Agents respond by devoting more human capital to 
research relative to the case of trade in only goods.  Since the growth rate of 
technology is now a function of the world stock of ideas, although the agent still 
devotes less human capital to research relative to autarky, the growth rate of 
technology with trade in ideas is higher. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents a synopsis of the 
methodology used by Romer [1990].  Section III explains the difference between   5
Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] and our alternative specification.  Section IV 
discusses the amended results.  Section V contains concluding remarks. 
 
II.  Summary of Romer [1990] 
 
 
The Romer [1990] model considers an infinitely lived representative agent 
who is endowed with labor (L ) and human capital (H ) and consumes only final 
goods that are competitively produced from labor, human capital (HY), and a 







YH L x d i
αβ α β −−
=
= ∫       
Technological change ( A & ) is the result of human capital (HA) and the stock of 
technology (A). 
(2)  A AH A δ = &   0 δ >         
The market for human capital is competitive. 
(3)  AY H HH =+        
Each intermediate producer is a monopolist facing with an inverse demand for its 
variety of input that is exactly equal to its marginal product in the production of Y. 
(4)  () 1 iY i P HLx r
αβ α β αβ
−− =−− =     
The profit maximizing price and output of the representative monopolist is defined as 
follows. 










=  −− 
  
The market for ideas is competitive and therefore  AAA P MC MR == .  The 
marginal revenue of a new idea is derived from the discounted future profits to the 











= ∫       
While the firm is still in the R&D phase, it faces a competitive market.  Therefore, it 
is the zero profit condition faced by the representative R&D firm that determines the 
wage for human capital devoted to R&D.
3 
(7)  HA wP A δ =        
The wage for human capital devoted to final goods (HY) is determined from its 
marginal product in terms of final goods. 
(8) 
11
YY wH L A x
α β α β α
−− − =     
A competitive human capital market implies that  HA ww = .  This may be used to 
solve for the optimal allocation of human capital between final production and R&D 
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III. Analysis of Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] 
 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] consider trade between two identical 
economies as described by Romer [1990].    The economies are identical only up until   7
trade is opened.
4  In so doing, they first consider trade in intermediate goods without 
trade in ideas.  Regarding the price of a new idea, they state the following: 
“  For the research sector, opening of trade implies that the market for 
any newly designed good is twice as large as it was in the absence of trade.  
This doubles the price of the patents and raises the return to investing human 
capital in research from  A P A δ  to 2 A P A δ .” [Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991, 
p. 543-4] 
This statement rests on the assumption that new intermediate goods produced in the 
open economy are not redundant.  In Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991], there is no 
foreign alternative intermediate good available to the final goods producer. On the 
other hand, we assume that each country produces its own version of each new 
intermediate good.  The return to investing in human capital in research still increases 
by a factor of 2 but in a slightly different manner.   
The return to research, wH, is determined from the zero profit condition of the 
individual researcher, which does not change. 
(13)  0 AA j A A j j PH A w H δπ ⋅−= =      
The output of individual R&D firm j equals  jA j AH A δ = .  Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
[1991] assume that R&D firm j doubles its output of A with trade.  This is strictly true 
only when new innovations are not redundant. If each country can produce its own 
version of every new innovation, then firm j may still double its output of A, but only 
as a response by firm j to a change in the competitive price, PA.  Therefore, consider 
the model similar to that presented by Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] except that 
firm j produces output Aj in response to price, PA.     8
The model is specified as follows.  There are two absolutely identical 
countries that may trade in intermediate goods but not in ideas.  Final goods 












= ∫     
Model symmetry implies that A=A
F.  Since there is no trade in ideas, the change in 
technology is solely a function of domestic stocks of A. 
(15)  A AH A δ = &   0 δ >       
The return on human capital in R&D, wA, is derived from the zero profit 
condition, equation (13), and the return on human capital in final goods production, 
wY, is derived from its marginal product. 











    
A competitive human capital market implies that  HA ww = which further 
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Notice that PA under trade, equation (18), versus PA under autarky, equation 
(11) differs by a factor of 2.  In other words, trade has doubled the relative price of 
patents, which has raised the return to investing in human capital, just as Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer [1991] predict.  The difference between them and us manifests itself in the 
analytic solution for the growth rate of technology, g. Compare equations (21) and 
(12). Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s [1991] solution for g as a result of trade in goods is 
analytically identical to the solution for g under autarky (equation (12)) such that they 
conclude that trade in goods has no growth effects.  
Note the intuitive difference.  In Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991], upon 
opening trade in goods, one country, say H, goes first by introducing an innovation.  
In exactly half the time its takes H to invent a still newer innovation, F introduces its 
latest innovation.  The two countries now proceed to take turns introducing new 
goods.  The proprietary firm of each new innovation may capitalize on both home and 
foreign demands but only for half the time that it did so under autarky. 
Here, upon opening trade in goods, both countries simultaneously introduce 
their respective versions of the newest innovation.  Since the two versions, foreign 
and domestic, are perfect substitutes, they must share the market thereby creating a 
duopoly where the intermediate producers are Cournot-Nash competitors.
5   
Trade in ideas as well as in intermediate goods is specified exactly as above 
except that the technology constraint, equation (15), and the zero profit condition, 
equation (13), must be altered to reflect trade in ideas. 
(22)  ()
F
A AH A A δ =+ &   0 δ >      
(23)  () 0
F
AA j A A j j PHA A w H δπ ⋅+ − = =     
Trade in ideas implies that the change in technology,  A & , is a result of the world stock 
of technology combined with domestic human capital effort.  Output of the individual   10
R&D firm j also must reflect trade in ideas such that  ()
F
jA j AH A A δ =+ .  The rest of 
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Table 1 presents the results from (1) autarky, (2) trade in intermediate goods 
only, (3) trade in goods as well as ideas, and (4) Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s [1991] 
trade in goods as well as ideas.  Notice that the growth rate of technology, g*, is a 
strictly a function of coefficients and the stock of human capital, H . Given their 
analytic solutions, it must be that g*
2<g*
1, 
13 ** g g < , 
23 ** g g < , and 
34 ** g g < , 
which implies that 
4312 **** g ggg >>>  as well as 
4312 **** rrrr >>> .
6 
Next consider the output of the intermediate good, xi, and the price of 
technology,  PA, across the three cases.  Technical Appendix 1 clearly shows that 
4312 **** iiii x xxx <<<  and 
4312 **** AAAA P PPP <<< . Figures I and II present a 
graphical representation of these results.  Notice that from Table I the demand for the 
intermediate goods, xi, as well as the price of technology, PA, depend solely on the 
human capital in final goods production, HY.   11
Finally consider the human capital allocations in cases 1, 2, 3, and 4.  Recall 
that for cases 1 and 2,  * * A gH δ = .  Therefore if g*
1>g*
2, then 
12 ** AA HH > and 
12 ** YY HH < . Intuitively, pro-competitive gains from trade implies higher production 
of intermediate goods, xi , which necessarily raises the marginal product on human 
capital in final production.  Simultaneously, the marginal product of human capital in 
research falls with the lower expectation of future monopoly profits.  Thus it follows 
that there should be relatively less human capital effort in research (and more in final 
goods production) with trade in goods than in autarky. 
When trade in ideas is allowed in addition to trade in goods, the growth rate of 
technology increases relative to autarky, i.e. 
13 ** g g < .  Notice that from Table 1, the 
analytic solutions for the optimal work effort, HA*, HY*, and consequently, the interest 
rate are identical for case 1 and case 3.  Therefore, if 
13 ** rr < , then 
13 ** YY HH <  
and 
13 ** AA HH > . Technical Appendix 2 shows that 
23 ** AA HH <  and 
23 ** YY HH >  as well as 
14 ** AA HH <  and 
14 ** YY HH > . Summing up the results, 
we may conclude that 
4132 **** AA AA HHHH >>> .  Figure III presents a graphical 





The results herein are complementary to those found in Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer [1991].  The general results from that paper as well as the limitations placed 
on those results by the authors still hold here.  They are that economic integration, 
when the change in technology is subject to increasing returns, has a positive long run 
effect on economic growth.  And given the nature of the exponential growth function, 
policies that affect trade necessarily affect growth and can have large cumulative   12
effects on economic welfare.  Furthermore, the two models ultimately characterize 
different sets of stylised facts that we observe in the world.  There certainly does exist 
the ability to innovate and reap the returns across the entire world (i.e. Microsoft).  
But there also exists the stylised fact that countries do produce their own versions of 
goods without the explicit exchange of ideas (i.e. automobile industry).  
The two different model specifications each have analytic strengths as well as 
weaknesses.  The main weakness of Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] is the stepwise 
nature of trade where each country takes turns innovating.  The main weakness here is 
that without trade in ideas, each country still comes up independently with identical 
innovations.  The main strength of Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] is that worldwide 
monopoly rents are available to innovators.  The main strength here is the pro-
competitive gains from trade from imperfect competition result in the dynamic 
setting.  
This paper adds to the literature in four ways. First, it provides an alternative 
specification to a widely cited piece of literature, Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991].  
Second, it demonstrates the relevance of standard trade theory on imperfect 
competition in the context of dynamic models of technological change.  In so doing, 
we highlight the pro-competitive gains from trade available as a result of imperfect 
competition in one of the sectors and show the negative growth effects of disallowing 
trade in ideas.  Third, the paper shows that the growth benefits from increased 
integration (i.e. trade in ideas) outweigh the negative growth effects of the pro-
competitive gains. Forth, it opens an interesting avenue of research into the other 
parallels that must exist between trade and new growth theory.  In other words, one 
may now consider in the above framework, any number of extensions from   13
differentiated countries to tax effects to the consideration of different manners of 
technological change.  
    14
Technical Appendices 
 
Technical Appendix 1 – Comparison of Intermediate Good, xi and the price of 
technology, PA, across cases 
 
•   Show that 




ii x x > . From the analytic solution to xi , the assumption implies 
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(note: The analytic solutions to r*
1 and r*


















H >  ) 
 
∴∴∴∴ It must be that 
12 ** ii x x < and given the analytic solution to PA , it must also be that 
12 ** AA P P < . chk. 
 
•   Show that 
13 ** ii x x > :  
 
The comparison of 
13 * .  * ii x vs x  may be simplified to 
13 * .   * YY Hv s H , whose solution 
we already know to be that 
13 ** YY HH <  which implies that 
13 ** ii x x >  and 
13 ** AA P P > . chk.  
 
•   Show that 
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∴∴∴∴ It must be that 
23 ** ii x x > and given the analytic solution to PA , it must also be that 
23 ** AA P P > . chk. 
 
•   Show that 




ii x x > . From the analytic solutions to xi , the assumption 
implies that   () ()
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αα −−
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∴∴∴∴ It must be that 
43 ** ii x x < and given the analytic solution to PA , it must also be that 
43 ** AA P P < . chk. 
 
 
Technical Appendix 2 – Comparisons of Human capital across cases 
 
•  Show that 
23 ** YY HH > and 




YY H H < and 
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AA H H > .    
 
23
AA H H > , given that 
2 2
A g H δ = and 
3 3 2 A g H δ = , implies that 
23 2g g > . 
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∴ It must be that 
23 ** YY HH >  and 
23 ** AA HH < . chk. 
 
•  Show that 
14 ** YY HH > and 
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14
AA H H > , given that 
1 1
A g H δ = and 
4 4 2 A g H δ = , implies that 
14 2g g > . 
 
























HH δ ρ δ ρ
θθ
−Λ −Λ  >  Λ+ Λ+ 
 or simply that  21 −> − .⊗  
 
∴ It must be that 
14 ** YY HH >  and 
14 ** AA HH < . chk.   16
 
Technical Appendix 3 – Case 1: No Trade 
 
Consider two identical economies in autarky defined as follows: 
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YH L x d i
αβ α β −−
=
= ∫  
Capital Formation:      tt K YC =− &  
Technological Change:    A AH A δ = &  
Total human capital:      AY H HH =+  
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Technical Appendix 4 – Case 2: Trade Only In Intermediate Goods 
 











= ∫  
(note that there are A different intermediate goods per country) 
 
2 identical countries! 
F AA =   
 
There is NO trade in ideas!   A AH A δ = &  
 
The human capital market in each country is competitive!   AY ww =  
 












(note: The price of A is determined by the horizontal summation of the demand for xi 
in each country.  The fact that the market for xi is twice as big in free trade versus 
autarky is captured endogenously in the price of A) 
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Technical Appendix 5 – Case 3: Trade In Intermediate Goods + Trade In Ideas 
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2 identical countries! 
F AA =   
 
Trade in ideas!   ()
F
A AH A A δ =+ &  
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11 22 AY P AH L x A
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Table I 
Analytic Comparisons 
Case 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4 
 
1. Autarky = Rivera-Batiz & Romer 
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4. Rivera-Batiz & Romer [1991]: 
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Figure I 
Intermediate Goods Market 
Cases 1 vs. 2
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Figure II 
Intermediate Goods Market 
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Figure III 
Human Capital Market  
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1 For example, Aghion and Howitt [1998] in their advanced text, Endogenous Growth Theory, present 
the incorrect Romer and River-Batiz [1991] results as part of the chapter, “Growth in Open 
Economies.” [Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 374] 
2 See Markusen, et. al. [1995], International Trade: Theory and Evidence, McGraw Hill, ch. 11, or any 
other good intermediate trade textbook for an exposition on imperfect competition and trade. 
3 This is the point where we diverge analytically from Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991].  They assume 
that trade in goods implies that  2 HA wP A δ =  (see Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991, p. 543-4).   We 
simply allow PA to adjust endogenously to the new market conditions. 
4 Although this is not explicitly stated with in Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991], it is certainly the case if 
countries can not produce redundant goods after they are allowed to trade. 
5 There is no need to consider Bertrand competition here because it would necessarily result marginal 
cost pricing and zero profits to intermediate producers.  This effectively removes any incentive to 
conduct research such that  0 A H = and  0 AK == & & .  In other words, if technological change is the 
engine of growth and without monopoly profits to provide the incentive to research, then there is no 
research and, as a consequence, no growth.  Interestingly enough, the Bertrand version also implies that 
the two countries are not only identical but also characterised by perfect competition and constant 
return to scale in its tradable goods, which is the standard “no trade” model. 
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